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The Question of an Armenian Revolution and the
Radicalization of the Committee of Union and Progress
toward the Armenian Genocide
Wolfgang Gust
Hamburg, Germany
Hilmar Kaiser, one of the ﬁrst German historians to work on the Armenian Genocide and one who
has often written about it as a historical fact, is now trying to dilute that history. In his latest article,
which consciously avoids use of the term genocide, Kaiser seeks to portray Mehmed Djemal Pasha,
a member of the Young Turk triumvirate ruling the Ottoman Empire during World War I, as an
individual resisting the genocidal policies of his co-conspirators within the Committee of Union and
Progress. Kaiser claims to employ Ottoman documents to demonstrate that the initial intention of
the Turkish government was to relocate the Ottoman Armenians for military reasons, although he
admits that they posed no imminent danger to the state. Kaiser indicates that the ﬁrst “relocations”
of Armenians took place in areas controlled by Djemal and were initiated by him, then goes on to
claim that even though the infamous death camp of Deir-es-Zor was located within his sphere of
power, he, in reality, protected the Armenians. However, facts showing the extent of the genocide
have been overlooked. This article will use archival documents from the Foreign Ofﬁce of the German Empire, the Ottoman Empire’s wartime ally, to demonstrate the shortcomings of Kaiser’s evidence and arguments.
Key words: Armenian Genocide, Djemal, Young Turks, Kaiser, German archives, Ottoman archives, German compliance, Zeitun, deportations

Hilmar Kaiser’s latest publication, “Regional Resistance to Central Government Policies:
Ahmed Djemal Pasha, the Governors of Aleppo, and Armenian Deportees in the Spring
and Summer of 1915,”1 states that there never was a national Armenian revolution that
seriously threatened the Ottoman Empire. This, however, is the key theory behind the
main argument that previously denied the Armenian Genocide, a theory that was
adopted at that time by the German allies of the Young Turk killers, against the better
knowledge of their own observers on site who vehemently contradicted this, but were
unable to assert themselves against their superiors.
Kaiser restricts his statements mainly to the sphere of control of the Fourth Army,
which was commanded by Mehmed Djemal Pasha. This sphere ranged from Zeitun, the
Armenian stronghold in the north, to the city of Urfa in the east, and included Syria
and Palestine, as well as Arabia as far as Mecca and Medina.
Regarding the Armenians in this region, the German vice-consul of Alexandretta
(Iskenderun), Hermann Hoffmann-Fölkersamb, who was often temporarily in charge
of such important consulates in Djemal’s area as Aleppo, Damascus, and Haifa, was certain: “I do not believe that they would commit treason.”2 Furthermore, with regard to
the alleged military danger posed by the Armenians, Hoffmann wrote,
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Apart from the case of Van and its adjacent zone, particular caution is called for
relative to the charge of a “militarily organized plot.” Certain local insurrectionary
movements cannot be treated as proof of such. For example, the fact that the revolt
in Zeitun cannot be singled out as a case of a conspiracy of that kind, is clearly evidenced in the reports of the Imperial Consulate in Aleppo. The uprising of the Armenians in the region of Suediye [Musa Dagh] (to the south of Alexandretta) was,
according to the descriptions even on the part of the Turkish military, not a conspiracy. The recovery of the revolutionaries from Suediye by French warships was
also not a long-planned act. This is apparent from the circumstances and the opinions of well-informed Turks.3

Kaiser agrees with him, albeit more theoretically, because he justiﬁes the brutal actions of the Turks against the supposed revolutionaries. And after his verbal knockout
against those who deny the genocide, he lets them land gently by claiming that Djemal
did not carry out any genocidal actions against the Armenians and, therefore, the word
genocide should not be included in his article.
Kaiser wants to prove that Djemal attempted to rescue the Armenians from annihilation. This is surprising because not only was the infamous death camp of Deir-es-Zor
located within Djemal’s sphere of power, but also the desert strip along the Euphrates
and especially along the Chabur River, where the surviving Armenians were literally
butchered.
Kaiser divides those who have done research on this genocide into two schools of
thought: on the one hand, there are those, including Vahakn N. Dadrian and Taner
Akçam, who started with the assumption that there was a central plan for eliminating
the Armenians; on the other hand, there are others, such as Raymond Kévorkian, who
assumed that there was a policy of resettlement that was meant to create a general
majority for the Turks or at least the Muslims. Both schools of thought, however, assumed that there was intent to annihilate the Armenians and other Christian minorities,
whose fate was, therefore, already settled before the beginning of the war.
Kaiser’s theory that originally there was no central plan at all opposes this. He
writes,
This article suggests that the notion of a uniﬁed body of genocidal conspirators exerting unrestrained control over the entire Ottoman Empire cannot be sustained. . . .
This regional study will challenge such notions. It claims that Ottoman deportation
policies concerning Armenians evolved in 1915 in a concrete historic context and
not from a conspiratorial plan waiting to be revealed.4

It was only at the end of May 1915, according to Kaiser’s conclusion, that the “actual”
situation led to the systematic deportation of Armenians from their areas of settlement
and a central management was put into place.
With regard to Mehmed Talât, the main person accused, and the Interior Ministry,
he writes,
Far from simply imposing its decisions, the ministry quickly met with resistance
from Djemal who doubted the wisdom of the central government’s policies. . . .
The opposition against Talaat’s and the ruling [Committee of Union and Progress]’s policy was stronger than has been assumed so far, reaching into the leadership of the party. At its core stood Ahmed Djemal Pasha.5
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Kaiser notes that by
introducing extensive documentation produced by Ottoman provincial and
military authorities, the article contextualizes Ottoman central government directives. . . . [The] Ottoman ofﬁcials at the highest level of government had detailed
knowledge of the consequences of their decisions. The data also conﬁrms in detail
shocking Western consular reports. Thus, the various sources corroborate each
other and form a consistent record.6

Many of these Western reports (mainly American and German) have meanwhile been
published. What new ﬁndings does Kaiser now convey based on these internal ﬁles? He
ﬁrst describes events that are certainly known. For example,
Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa units were to perform acts of sabotage and stir up rebellions
among the local Muslim population. In this connection, the CUP hoped to win the
cooperation of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), which had branches
in both countries. During CUP–ARF negotiations Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa members revealed their secret agenda, but failed to obtain the ARF’s cooperation.7

Kaiser then goes on to write of the Gulf of Alexandretta (Iskenderun), where the Turks
feared naval attacks by the Entente ﬂeet and arrested several Armenians whom, according to Kaiser, they suspected of being in contact with British ships.
Vice-Consul Hoffmann reported the following regarding this episode from the
Consulate in Alexandretta: twice, when the English cruiser Doris landed, Armenian soldiers were taken prisoner. “Once, an Armenian sergeant of a group of seven men
(equipped with malfunctioning Martinis) in a trench (with no emergency exit) supposedly surrendered by waving a handkerchief.”8 In his article, Hilmar Kaiser now presents
the reasons, based on Ottoman ﬁles:
In the south, along the Gulf of Alexandretta, Ottoman commanders worried about
an allied landing that could cut off the supply lines of the Ottoman armies in Palestine, Mesopotamia, and parts of the eastern front. In Adana province, authorities
had apprehended some Armenians who had been in touch with British warships
bombarding the coast. The espionage was deemed serious as few troops and hardly
any artillery were available to defend the coast. Moreover, Adana provincial authorities had ﬁled worrying reports about the activities of Armenian political parties.
The governor now considered the removal of all Armenians from the coast to the
interior of the province. Exemplary punishment was to be meted out to those Armenians found guilty in order to serve as a deterrent to others. Talaat approved the
governor’s proposal for the deportation of the town of Dortyol on March 2, 1915.
Moreover, the minister ordered the authorities to eradicate any Armenian revolutionary activity. On March 13, 1915, Djemal speciﬁed other measures against a
feared Armenian uprising. A number of troops would stay in Adana, while regional
commanders would establish courts-martial in Armenian-inhabited areas. Moreover, preparations for the deportation of Armenians from Aleppo province had
been authorized.9

What Vice-Consul Hoffmann regarded as a triﬂe and, therefore, what the consulate
ignored, was sufﬁcient reason for Talât, Djemal, and the rest to initiate the genocide.
According to Kaiser, courts martial were established for civilians, Armenians hanged
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merely as a deterrent and driven from their native areas, not because of anything they
had done that was proven, but solely on the basis of suspicions. Vice-Consul Hoffmann
reported at the time on this matter, using Dortyol as an example, “Out of Fakhri Pasha’s
own mouth I heard that they will not shy away from violence and even injustices.”10
General Fakhri Pasha was Djemal’s military leader in that region.
In other words, internal reports also stated that the main initiator of the ﬁrst Armenian deportations was the supposed member of the resistance, Djemal Pasha. Kaiser
could hardly have begun the defense of his hero in a more curious manner, but it becomes even stranger! According to Kaiser, “In this climate . . . Zeitun gained special
importance.”11 The mountain town of Zeitun, located north of Marash, had been an
Armenian stronghold since time immemorial. It had previously defended itself against all
of the persecutions against the Armenians. In August 1914, Armenians who were once
again called to arms escaped to the mountains and entrenched themselves in a monastery
just outside of the town. Kaiser states that “the Muslim population in the region was agitated as it had answered the call.”12 As a result, this could—and probably was meant to—
create the impression that desertion was a very Armenian type of problem. In actual fact,
the deserters in Zeitun also included Turks, and desertion was to become one of the largest problems faced by the Turkish Army. “Today, the number of Turkish deserters is
higher than the number of soldiers actually in the army,” General Liman von Sanders,
the commanding German ofﬁcer, ascertained at the end of the war.13
The events in Zeitun are described in far more detail in the German documents
than in Kaiser’s article.14 For example, Kaiser does not reveal that, with the assistance of
the German artillery ofﬁcer Eberhard Count Wolffskeel von Reichenberg, the monastery the deserters escaped to was destroyed; nor does he mention the request made by
the German gunner to prohibit the journey of the German consul in Aleppo Walter
Rössler to Zeitun—which the Embassy then did—or the extremely detailed and enlightening report by the Armenian Catholicos of Cilicia on these events.15 In particular,
Kaiser does not report that, after his investigation in Marash, Rössler did not ﬁnd any
evidence at all why the government should have had a reason for accusing the Armenians in Zeitun of conspiracy. The Armenians were deported simply out of fear (i.e.,
completely indiscriminately).
According to Kaiser, Djemal ordered the deportation of some families, but then
local authorities “demanded that all Armenians should be investigated, including those
who were not suspect, on the grounds that they all shared the same mentality.”16
Although the reader does not ﬁnd out who these “local authorities” are, their attitude
does become clear: “The local authorities alleged that Armenians had displaced Muslims in the past. Now Armenian villagers should be deported wholesale and replaced
with Muslim settlers.”17 Djemal soothed his conscience by ordering that no innocent
Armenian be harmed, but then agreed in practice with the unqualiﬁed arguments of the
unnamed sources: “The general proposed sending two-thirds of Zeitun’s Armenian
population to the plains of Konia province. There they would be dispersed and settled
among Muslim villagers” because he “thought the time had come to solve the ‘Zeitun
problem’ once and for all,” Kaiser reports.18 According to German reports, there was no
uprising in Zeitun, and the Armenian population worked closely with authorities to
turn in deserters. Why, then, in Djemal’s (or Kaiser’s) view, did a problem have to be
solved “once and for all” by ﬁnally deporting all of the Armenians? Kaiser gives the following explanation: “This ambitious project went beyond controlling the area and
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aimed at destroying the demographic basis for any possible sustained popular Armenian resistance.”19 However, the governor of Aleppo, Djelal Bey, did not see any reason
at all for deporting the Armenians of Zeitun, and had this view placed on record. Djemal arranged that Djelal no longer have jurisdiction over the region around Marash,
and therefore Zeitun, so that Djelal could not exert any inﬂuence on the deportations.
Contrary to Djemal, Djelal was regarded by the Germans—and the Americans—as a
real opponent of the Armenian deportations in Cilicia.
Kaiser writes that “by the middle of April 1915, Djemal extended the deportations
within the 4th Army’s area, arguing that concentrations of Armenians might become
dangerous in future”—in other words, pure and unadulterated ethnic cleansing.20 The
settlement of deported Armenians was, therefore, to be carried out far away from other
Armenian communities, but care was to be taken to ensure the safety of the Armenians.
Kaiser offers as proof a report by Baron Max von Oppenheim, head of the German
Information Service for the Orient, to Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg in Berlin, dated
29 August 1915. This report included ﬁve orders by Djemal as enclosures, written in
French. Enclosure two, dated 2 April 1915, includes the following extract from Djemal’s
orders to the commanding chief of the army: “Tout groupement arménien existant dans
la zone de la IV. Armée et pouvant être dangereux à l’avenir doit être dispersé” (Any
Armenian grouping existing in the zone of the Fourth Army and which could be potentially dangerous for the future must be dispersed). It is worded in a way that anticipates
the subsequent national deportation order. However, Enclosure one contains an order
issued by Djemal dated 16 March 1915, stating that “le bien et la vie et l’honneur de la
population arménienne et musulmane sont sous la sauvegarde du Gouvernement Ottoman. Ils peuvent être convaincus qu’ils ne seront l’objet d’aucune oppression et peuvent
vaguer tranquillement à leurs affaires et travaux” (The well-being and life and honor of
both the Armenian and Muslim populations are under the protection of the Ottoman
Government. They can be convinced that they will not be subject to any oppression and
therefore can go about their business and work calmly).21
Anyone who has dealt with the Armenian Genocide will rub their eyes in disbelief
because it is documented there in black and white that Djemal ordered for both Muslims and Armenians to be treated equally well. He ordered this, but it seems no one followed this order. Strangely, however, Kaiser cites a German source for Djemal’s order,
while previously he used only Ottoman sources for such orders. The reason is soon discovered: the author of this document is Baron Max von Oppenheim, who was extremely
well-known in Germany at that time as a great archaeologist, while, at the same time,
being one of the most ambivalent German politicians in the entire “Orient,” known by
the British only as the “Lying Baron.”
Oppenheim described himself as a friend of Djemal’s and, therefore, his opinion of
what constitutes the typical characteristics of an Armenian is not without interest:
Their proverbial trickiness in business, their addiction to intrigues, their conceit
and sense of revolution, but especially the way they constantly sprawl all over their
environment and, during the recent past, the way they openly show their hostility
towards the Turks.

Oppenheim says that “should the enemy land, the Armenians would join the enemy to
form a mutual revolt.” According to Oppenheim, “such a landing could be expected
foremost just here, at the Gulf of Alexandretta and near Mersina.” He warned that
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the consequences in connection with a large Armenian uprising could have been
unforeseeable: once it held the passes over the Zeihun, the Djihan, and the Cilician
highland, the enemy could have separated Asia Minor and the European part of
Turkey from the entire southern and southeastern part of the empire.22

Vice-Consul Hoffmann’s reply to the report on Oppenheim’s fantasies of espionage in
the Gulf of Alexandretta was, “I have never heard this accusation, not even from the
Turkish Muslim side, although the case is known to me in full detail.”23
Kaiser deals with the prophylactic deportations of the Armenians from Zeitun and
the coast of the Gulf of Alexandretta as events that were decided on from case to case,
even though they follow exactly the same logic—or rather, illogic—as the deportation
orders set out in writing on May 27. Kaiser claims that “more carefully planned and coordinated deportations were not part of Ottoman government action at this point” and
believes that this allows him to conclude that “this indicates that the decision for such a
change of policy came about signiﬁcantly later than many authors suspect.” This is pure
speculation. In fact, the differences between the deportations in February–March and
those in May–June are minor.
Actually, one could say that a change in policy had already taken place several
years earlier, when the leading Young Turks gave up their idea of a multinational country and began calling for a homogenous Turkish state. As early as 14 October 1910, Zitkovszky, the Austrian-Hungarian vice-consul in Monastir, reported to his foreign
secretary, Aehrenthal, that Ottoman Home Secretary Talât had given a political speech
in the secret circle of the Young Turk Committee in Thessaloniki, in which he had said
the following:
You are aware that by the terms of the Constitution, equality of Muslim and Ghiaur
was afﬁrmed by you. One and all know and feel that this is an unrealizable ideal.
The Sheriat and the history from the past oppose this, as do the feelings of hundreds of thousands of Muslims, and even the sentiments of the Ghiaurs themselves,
who stubbornly resist every attempt to Ottomanize them, present an impenetrable
barrier to the establishment of real equality. We have made unsuccessful attempts
to convert the Ghiaur into a loyal Ottoman, and all such efforts must inevitably
fail. . . .24

In documents currently housed at the Archives of the French Foreign Ofﬁce, the
Austrian consul is identiﬁed as the best-informed man about the secret circles of the
CUP. And Talât’s long speech, reported by the French consul, was fully conﬁrmed by
Djavid, one of Talât’s closest friends, who examined the paper three days later.25 There
was to be no room in this unitary state for Christian minorities, and ultimately, the concept of Ottomanizing the empire was consolidated into a policy of annihilation. Djemal’s deportations of the Armenians within his sphere of control were the beginning of
the end of the Ottoman Armenians.
For Kaiser, the arrests and deportations of the Armenian elite from Constantinople
on 24 April 1915 are not a reply to Van—where, after all, the Armenians took defensive
action that was under military organization and successful for weeks—but to Zeitun. At
least, “the Zeitun affair was given as one reason for the crack down” against the Armenians.26 He lists orders given by Talât during the days right after April 24 to the most
important provincial towns, in which allegedly dangerous Armenians were staying.
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Djemal was informed by Talât that the deportations from Zeitun to Konia had been
stopped and the deportees were sent to Deir-es-Zor in the Syrian Desert; this suggests
that a ﬁnalized and very deﬁnite plan already existed. Kaiser himself is forced to admit
that
the order demonstrated that the central government asserted its leadership in the
organization of deportations empire-wide, including the 4th Army’s region. Talaat
did not wait for Djemal’s response and instructed the authorities at Adana, Aleppo,
and Marash accordingly.27

Those Armenians who had been deported received very little assistance from the
government. Kaiser reports that there were letters regarding ﬁnancial aid that never materialized and writes, “In other words, the Armenian deportations would be disastrous
and Ottoman authorities knew this from the moment they gave the orders.”28 Aleppo
Governor Djelal Bey, especially, had repeatedly requested exact information on the
form and ﬁnancing of a (supposedly planned) resettlement; except for promises, he
never received anything. The offers from foreign organizations—for example, the
American Red Cross—were, according to Kaiser, rejected on “political grounds.”29
While the houses the Armenians were forced to give up became available to Muslim refugees from the Balkans, it was not possible to procure any housing whatsoever for the
Armenians. Whatever Djelal requested—and he was supported by Djemal—was, at
best, answered by Talât with promises. However, according to Kaiser, “Talaat’s promises for sufﬁcient funding had not materialized.”30
Kaiser writes, “The Ottoman defeat at Van marked a turning point after which the
deportations were gradually transformed into a comprehensive policy to eliminate the
Armenian community as a political force.”31 Talât also sent Djemal a detailed plan of
all those cities and regions from which the Armenians were deported, whereby “the Armenians were allowed to take along all of their movable property.”32 However, a “provisional law” was declared on 27 May 1915 and “details of the expropriations showed that
the deportations were to create permanent changes in the demographic structure and
that the deportations were not a temporary wartime measure as had been stipulated in
the law.”33
Kaiser reports on the alarming information passed on by the German consul in
Aleppo, Walter Rössler, to his embassy and comments on it:
The reports by Rössler document a degree of cooperation with Djelal that went
beyond the usual consular practice. The two men tried to mobilize the German
embassy in order to lobby the Ottoman central government on behalf of the Armenians. At the same time, Rössler cooperated with Sahag, a leader of a community
accused of treason.34

Was Sahag, the Catholicos of the Armenians in Cilicia, a traitor in Kaiser’s eyes because
he took care of his ﬂock? Kaiser continues, “Obviously, both the consul and the governor entertained views on what needed to be done quite different from those prevalent
in the capital.”35
During the ensuing period, Hilmar Kaiser quotes from letters written by Sahag to
the German ambassador, Wangenheim, even though they were actually letters to the
Armenian patriarch in Constantinople. The German consul in Adana, Büge, had had
these letters sent via the embassy to the Armenian spiritual leader.36 There was,
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however, no conspiratorial connection between Armenians and top German politicians
and diplomats in Constantinople, who continued to be on the side of the Young Turks,
who were guilty of genocide. On the embassy’s orders, letters from the catholicos to the
patriarch were not even allowed to be transported by German couriers in the ensuing
period without being opened. German censorship replaced that of the Young Turks.37
On July 26, the German embassy went even a step further in its refusal to send messages
from the catholicos to the patriarch and simply returned an unopened letter from Sahag
that had been passed on by Rössler.38
Kaiser writes that Djemal ordered that those Armenians who were deported because
of their political beliefs were to be treated “correctly,” whereby he refers once again not
to Ottoman ﬁles, but to Djemal’s orders, which had been passed on to the German
authorities by Max von Oppenheim.39 According to these texts, Djemal had ordered
that Armenians were to be treated according to their social position (leur position sociale); this leaves room for a great deal of interpretation.40 The fact that Kaiser does not
quote any Ottoman documents appears to make it questionable whether the orders
passed on by von Oppenheim were issued at all and whether they were ever followed.
Another unclear point in Kaiser’s article is Djemal’s request to send a particular
ofﬁcial to Aleppo; Kaiser does not make clear what assignment this ofﬁcial was to carry
out in Aleppo. However, there is an indication from Rössler that may possibly refer
to the same person: “A particular ofﬁcial, Eyub Bey, has been sent to Aleppo to carry
out the government’s policies against Armenians. He reports directly to Fakri (Bey)
Pasha,” the German consul said in his telegram. “This effectively eliminates the governor, Djelal Bey; the government knows that he is in favor of a more lenient policy.”41
On the other hand, Kaiser gives the impression that the mild-mannered governor,
Djelal, and the mild-mannered commanding ofﬁcer, Djemal, were the best of friends;
both advocated a more humane treatment of the Armenians. Eyub Bey, however, was a
notorious annihilator of the Armenians, as proven by German sources. If Kaiser is referring to Eyub Bey when he speaks of the ofﬁcial, then the Armenian annihilator was at
least subordinate to Fakhri Pasha and, therefore, Djemal.
Kaiser describes how Djemal attempted to inform Talât of the suffering of the Armenians and ﬁnd money for them. In Aleppo, he ordered that ﬁve metallics be spent on
adults and four on children. He referred to a report by Rössler dated 17 July 1915, who
had listed the amounts in a single paragraph and remarked that, as a result of Djemal’s
order, the deported Armenians were able to rest somewhat in Aleppo. However, Rössler’s report consists of a long list of atrocities that were carried out against the Armenians in Djemal’s sphere of control. It ends with the following paragraph:
The Turkish government has driven its Armenian subjects—the innocent ones,
mark you—into the desert in thousands upon thousands, under the pretext of having to remove them from the war areas, exempting neither the sick nor pregnant
women nor the families of conscripted men, has given them both food and water in
insufﬁcient quantities and irregularly, has done nothing against the epidemics
which have broken out amongst them, has driven the women to such desperation
that they set out their babies and newborns by the wayside, has sold their adolescent daughters, with the result that they have thrown themselves even with their
small children into the river. It has left them to the mercy of their guards and therefore to dishonor; an escort which dragged away the girls and sold them. It has
driven them into the hands of the Bedouins, who have plundered and kidnapped
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them. It has had the men illegally shot in desolate places and the bodies of its victims fed to the dogs and birds of prey. It is supposed to have arranged for the murders of the representatives whom it had sent into exile. It has released prisoners
from the prisons, put them in soldiers’ uniforms and sent them to the areas where
the deportees would be passing through. It has called up Circassian volunteers and
set them onto the Armenians.42

Djemal had six of these Circassian murderers executed, as Kaiser proudly reports.
Kaiser picks harmless sentences out of the German reports so as to give the impression
that the foreign witnesses were covering up their euphemisms.
Kaiser’s article becomes even stranger. He writes, “Rössler met with Djemal and reported positively on his talks.”43 In note 94, Kaiser quotes as his source “Consulate of
Aleppo, Package 1, Vol. 1/2, No. 1366, Rössler to Embassy, Aleppo, June 28, 1915, telegram 18.” The text found in the consulate ﬁles goes as follows: “Have now repeatedly
negotiated with Djemal Pasha. All of my assignments will be handled smoothly together
with him. Will presumably travel south with Djemal in approx. eight days.” This text
was sent as telegram no. 18 to Constantinople on June 28, but not to the embassy and,
therefore, it is not in the ﬁles there. Kaiser has confused Rössler with Oppenheim, who
had written this text. In the document quoted by Kaiser, Rössler had struck out the sender, “Oppenheim,” and had written “Rössler” beneath it. Kaiser, the historian, was
unable to interpret this event—or did not want to—because at the beginning of the text
Rössler had clearly added in his own handwriting: “No. 18 dated June 28—from Baron
Oppenheim.” The telegram was then sent to Oppenheim’s ofﬁce in Constantinople.
Kaiser then describes the deportations and killings that began to take place
throughout the country, whereby he generally follows Rössler’s reports and Djemal’s orders in Oppenheim’s report.44 Without doubt, the most important decision made by
the government during this period was to recall the mild-mannered Djelal, of which
Rössler informed his embassy in a telegram that is quoted by Kaiser, albeit once more
in an abridged fashion:
Rössler cabled that Djelal would have to leave his post because of his refusal to
deport Armenians from his province. Djelal had even guaranteed their good behaviour. Rössler suspected that the government wanted to have a free hand against
the Armenians.45

However, Kaiser suppresses an addendum to the telegram. Rössler had noted, “This
recall is regrettably not in Turkey’s interest; presumably, the result will also be an escalation in the government’s Arabic policy.”46 Kaiser cites Rössler’s handwritten note as the
source on which his telegram was based.47 It includes not only the addendum regarding
Arabic policy, but also Rössler’s original sentence: “He [Djelal] had the opportunity to
send a telegram to the government during the past few days, informing it that he did
not approve of the actions against the Arabs in Beirut.” It was, therefore, apparent that
it was primarily Djelal’s protest against Djemal’s hard-line policy against the Arabs that
resulted in his being recalled. In his article, Kaiser does not mention the Fourth Army’s
commanding ofﬁcer’s policy on Arabs anywhere at all.
Using Ottoman ﬁles, Kaiser describes in detail the purely statistical progress of the
deportations. With regard to a description of the inhuman treatment of the deportees
as well as the political consequences, he refers to Rössler’s reports.48 Rössler had written
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that “it is becoming ever clearer that the orders for the harshest and most merciless
implementation of the deportation decided on by the government must be put down to
Fakhri Pasha and comes from him”—in other words, from Djemal’s military assistant.49
However, Kaiser also hints several times at Fakhri’s fatal role.
Kaiser argues that the fate of the deported Armenians proves the lack rather than
the existence of an annihilation plan. As a consequence, the decision regarding the Armenians could not have been made in March, as some researchers claimed. Elements of
planning were ﬁrst cited in May and June as “a response to the ensuing chaos along the
deportation routes and in the destination areas.” He states that the deportations had
not begun when the long-awaited opportunity presented itself, nor was a long-term program put into action. In his view, the CUP pushed the deportations without any previous planning or preparation. There was neither a monolithic CUP nor a dominating
group on the committee.
Kaiser offers very little proof in his article for his antithesis. The behavior of Djemal
and his ofﬁcers could certainly have also been explained if the Committee for Union
and Progress had already agreed at this time on a deportation plan. The Young Turks’
fear that the Entente ﬂeet would attempt to land in the Gulf of Alexandretta was understandable—the coastal strip was, in fact, without any defense whatsoever. Even the German consul in Adana had determined this to his great surprise and reported it to his
embassy. The Entente’s ﬂeet was intact and on site; ships landed several times in those
Ottoman harbors of the Mediterranean that had declared themselves free cities. Without doubt, the Armenian population in this region sympathized with the British and
the French, but they were by no means prepared or in a position to provide military
assistance. The Armenians may have been deported into the interior for reasons of
extreme military caution, or following a decision that had been made to eradicate them.
Therefore, Kaiser’s conclusion is not substantiated.
At the beginning of the war, the situation for the Armenians within the sphere of
control of the Fourth Army, of which Djemal was commanding ofﬁcer, was somewhat
worse than in the rest of the country, as shown by the actions taken against them.
Towards the end of the war, the situation was reversed; apart from Constantinople and
Smyrna, far more Armenians survived within Djemal’s sphere of control than elsewhere
in the Ottoman Empire. Western Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine were the only regions in
which a relatively large number of Armenians (estimated at approximately 100,000–
150,000 people) survived the end of the war, albeit under the most severe conditions.
Kaiser believes that this is due to the resistance of the governor of Aleppo, Djelal,
and to a lesser extent that of his successor, Bekir Sami, which is even more surprising
since the latter described the Armenians as “microbes,” thereby outing himself as a racist. Kaiser even speaks of a tacit agreement between these two and Rössler, without
going into details. However, he presents Djemal Pasha as the chief resistance ﬁghter.
According to Kaiser,
If there ever was a secret CUP conference passing a decision on the deportations,
CUP leader Ahmed Djemal had failed to learn about it. . . . He had his own ideas
about settlement areas, the execution of deportations, the provisioning and reimbursement of deportees and, most importantly, also on their protection. Brieﬂy put,
he advocated some deportations and even initiated some others, but wanted to
have them organized in a way that did not mean annihilation (of the Armenians).
His orders for the protection of deportees were not empty words, as prominent
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CUP operatives found out when they were convicted by a 4th Army court martial
and executed.50

Kaiser remarks that the honor of the Fourth Army demanded that the Armenians be resettled and Armenian villages set up. Djemal transmitted this to the governor of Syria
Hulusi Bey, who immediately reported him to the central administration, thereby passing this on for future generations.
Kaiser writes that neither civilians nor the military in the Fourth Army determined
that there were either revolts or a widespread conspiracy by or a dangerous threat from
the Armenians. The leader of the army, Djemal, gave political or social reasons as
grounds for the deportation programs, which were temporary and limited to the duration of the war. Either he was unaware of the long-term plans of the home secretary or
he opposed them. Djemal knew exactly what was happening in other regions; he certainly did not prevent deportees from being sent to these regions. Kaiser writes that this
must have led to their annihilation: “at times collaboration and resistance were close
neighbours.”51 According to Kaiser, the case of the Fourth Army “shows, however, that
the notion of an empire-wide genocide of Ottoman Armenians perpetrated by a uniﬁed
CUP is untenable. This kind of thinking needs to be revised and freed of claims that are
based on imagination rather than evidence.”52
Until today, the only German historian who has seriously engaged himself with the
Armenian Genocide—for which he was greatly admired—now argues against the theses
of other researchers, but is not in a position to prove his own argument conclusively.
He conceals severe atrocities committed by the Ottoman perpetrators, for example by
Fakhri Pasha, who brutally suppressed alleged uprisings (e.g., in Urfa), and fantasizes
about Western political powers who undertook less against the murderous frenzy of the
Young Turks than the Fourth Army, even though he knows very well that the only
Western power in Asia Minor that had military possibilities, namely Imperial Germany,
was most deﬁnitely not prepared to do anything for the Armenians and permitted its
own ofﬁcers to drive Armenian civilians to their deaths.
There was a major difference between the age-old settlement areas of the Ottoman
Armenians in northeastern Turkey and their settlements in the cities, and Djemal’s
sphere of control. There were hardly any Armenians in Palestine or even in the Lebanese mountains, which even today is still a center of Armenian life. The majority of the
Armenians within Djemal’s sphere of control came from Cilicia, the province around
the city of Adana; Djemal was governor of this city before the war and had many old
connections from that period.
While the Armenians in the northeast were mainly farmers and craftsmen in the
towns, wealth was a characteristic of many of those Armenians in Cilicia and also in the
west who were deported to Djemal’s sphere of control. They had built up economically
ﬂourishing businesses and accumulated property. Their wealth was one of the keys to
survival for many deportees, by giving “rescuers” a share of their companies, transferring ownership of their properties to public ofﬁcials, providing money for bribes, or
creating ties between Turkish and Armenian businessmen. Consul Hoffmann, who
often represented Rössler, suspected that “the Armenian population of Aleppo seem to
owe the fact that they are still here mainly to the resistance of those local circles who
would suffer great ﬁnancial losses if they disappeared.”53 However, these economic
components do not appear at all in Kaiser’s study, which only claims to identify “a deﬁnite historical connection.”
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Djemal, who dreamed of building himself a long-term power base in Palestine and,
if possible, Egypt, did a great deal to ensure that in future he would have wealthy and
hard-working Armenians, namely those whose lives he had saved. He began by setting
up Sahag, the catholicos who was expelled from his home in Cilicia, in Jerusalem
and ensuring that, in accordance with the decree dated 30 July 1916, he became the
catholicos-patriarch of all of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and resided in
Jerusalem after the Young Turks dissolved the Constantinople patriarchate. In this
way, he assured himself of the important spiritual leadership over the Armenians. Unfortunately, while preserving the lives of perhaps 150,000 Armenians—in terrible
conditions—he helped kill another 150,000.
Instead of speaking of the opportunities missed by the Great Powers of the West to
stop this genocide, Kaiser could have pointed out Djemal’s attempts to use these Great
Powers for his own interests. Raymond Kévorkian brought up the subject of secret discussions that were held between Djemal on the one hand and the French, British, and
Russians on the other. In December 1915, Djemal informed his partners in these discussions that he was prepared to march to Constantinople with an army in order to dismiss
the CUP and take over power himself, provided the Entente guaranteed the integrity of
the Ottoman Empire, including Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Arabia, Armenia, and
Kurdistan, and, furthermore, provided it was prepared to make him the sultan with the
right of succession for his descendents. In return, he would protect the Armenians and
end the genocide. In the end, these discussions failed because of the fears of the French
and the British that the Russians, who at that time had advanced as far as Trebizond
and Erzerum, would use this opportunity to ﬁnally entrench themselves in Constantinople, for which they had been striving for a very long time.54
This was not the only aspect that Hilmar Kaiser completely ignored in his assessment of Djemal. What was inconsistent with his gloriﬁcation of the good guy of Jerusalem was also the fanatical hatred with which Djemal persecuted the Arabs; he had
begun to physically wipe out their elite.
It was not only the Arabs who trembled before Djemal, but the Jews and possibly
other groups as well, as still unpublished German documents may show. One case was
researched recently by German historian Michael Hesemann. At the beginning of 1917,
the Palestine potentate had ordered the deportation of the Jews from Jaffa due to alleged
collaboration with the British. Hesemann writes that
over 8,000 Jews were chased out of their houses without permission to take food or
baggage with them. Their houses were looted by the Turks in front of their eyes.
Two Jews were hanged at the gates of the Jewish suburb, as an example for anyone
who dared to resist the looters. Eyewitnesses reported on the inhuman cruelty of
the soldiers. Dozens of Jews were later found dead in the dunes of Jaffa. A dispatch
from the Zionist ofﬁce in Copenhagen ended by voicing the fear that after the
threats from Djemal Pasha the Palestinian Jews could expect the same cruel fate as
the Armenians: extermination by hunger, thirst and epidemics.55

At the beginning of December 1917, shortly before the British took Jerusalem, the
Jews of that city were saved by German General von Falkenhayn, who received information through Eugenio Pacelli, the nuncio in Germany at that time who was to later
become pope, and the Foreign Ofﬁce. Jakob Thon, head of the Zionist ofﬁce in Jerusalem at that time, wrote,
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It was a particular stroke of good fortune that General von Falkenhayn had
supreme command during the last critical days. In this case, [Djemal] Pasha would
have chased the population out of the entire region, as he had often threatened to
do, and turned the country into ruins. Together with the entire rest of the population, both Christian and Muslim, we must be deeply grateful to P[acelli] who protected the civil population from demise by preventing the complete evacuation of
this region as planned.56

It will still take a long time before we are fully clear on all the details of the Armenian Genocide after so much effort has been spent on manipulating it to make it disappear.
Wolfgang Gust, born in 1935 in Hannover, Germany, has served as correspondent, editor, and director
of the German news magazine DER SPIEGEL for 30 years. He has published books and an expansive
collection of German Foreign Ofﬁce documents on the Armenian Genocide, which is available at www.
armenocide.net.
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